WORLD RULE OF LAW:
THE JURISDICTION OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE*
WALLACE MCCLUREt

NE OF THE fundamental prerequisites of a world community
functioning under a regime of law and not of arbitrary power is
the possession of a court of plenary jurisdiction. The ordinary conception of a court presupposes a tribunal in which persons or groups of
persons-in the world community, a fortiori, states-may seek and
obtain redress for the violation of their legal rights. It would fly in the
face of even the most elementary ideas of the maintenance of legal order
to suggest that the defendant in a judicial proceeding could decide for
himself or itself whether the charge will be answered or ignored. The
right to sue, one of the most salutary of normal human rights, is inseparable from the right to be sued-and the legal duty to accept suit
and abide by the decision of the court. Such institution and such custom
0
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accepted as law are indispensable if "the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations" are to be as firmly established in the community of nations as in nations worthy to be regarded individually as
civilized.
The world legal order as evolved to the present lacks this attribute.
Accordingly, it is of the highest category of importance that attention
be given to the jurisdiction of the highest judicial tribunal of that order,
the United Nations International Court of Justice-the World Court in
well-chosen common parlance-particularly the exception from such
jurisdiction "ipso facto and without special agreement" of "disputes with
regard to matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction
of the United States of America as determined by the United States of
America."1 In the spring of 1959, nearly thirteen years after the adoption of the resolution of the United States Senate claiming as of right
such ex parte disposition of a case in which the United States might be
defendant, a resolution to repeal the words "as determined by the
United States of America" was introduced into that body,2 promptly
attracting bipartisan sponsorship. Although fully endorsed by the
executive branch of the Government, it still awaited action by the Committee on Foreign Relations when the first session of the Eighty-Sixth
Congress adjourned at mid-September, that year.
In the phrase "as determined by the United States of America"
lay a great gulf fixed in the jurisprudence of centuries and an unbridged
schism in the traditional policy of the United States from the presidency of John Adams to the presidency of Eisenhower, dividing that
policy between the rule of law through third-party judgment and the
rule of arbitrary ex parte determination of the case by the United States
itself.
II
When Washington was president and Jefferson and Randolph were
succeeding secretaries of state, the rule of law characterized public
policy. In the first international treaty' of the United States under the
Constitution put into operation in 1789, for the enactment of which
Chief Justice John Jay was sent to negotiate with Lord Grenville,
representative of Great Britain, provision was made for the peaceful
1

Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 36, para. 2, 59 Stat. 1o55 (.945)

(emphasis added in last clause) [hereinafter cited as

STAT. INT'L CT. JUST.]
S. Res. 94, 86th Cong., ist Sess. (1959), by Sen. Humphrey, of Minnesota.
3 8 Stat. i16 (1794) 5 2 MILLER, TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTs op
2

THE UNITED STATES OP AMERICA 245 (193).
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settlement of current disputes. For those not resolved by the instrument itself, three arbitral commissions were agreed to and set up. They
dealt with disputes arising out of boundary uncertainties and two categories of claims. The first tribunal completed its work with good humor
and good faith, reaching a lasting settlement. One of the claims commissions5 was set up to effectuate a provision of the treaty of peace
that marked the successful achievement of the membership of the
United States in the world community. Composed of five commissioners, two appointed by each government, the fifth chosen by lot, it
was subject to the further stipulation of the treaty that three of the
commissioners should have power to act as the tribunal, provided one
of those named on each side and the fifth one should be present.7 When
in 1799 they found that many of the awards were going or were likely
to go against their contentions, both United States commissioners withdrew, thus depriving the majority of capacity to reach decisions."
It is, of course, no function of this article to appraise the justice of
what the majority might have held, but it is obvious that the United
States members of the international tribunal exercised a veto the effect
of which was to defeat the entire effort to arbitrate the dispute. From
these successful and unsuccessful arbitrations at the beginning of United
States history, clear lines of development extend to the action of the
Committee on Foreign Relations and the variant action of the Senate
in 1946-the former accepting without such a reservation the full jurisdiction of the World Court, the other encumbering the declaration of
acceptance with the above-described amending reservation designed to
enable the United States, in the final analysis, to predetermine the
outcome of a case against it by refusing to allow the Court to consider
its merits. The obligation accepted, as it were, with the right hand
could thus be cast aside by a gesture of the left.
What, then, is the present policy of the people of the United States
with respect to international adjudication? Do they really want to do
their part to strengthen the rule of law in the world, or do they prefer
to reserve what their Senate considered the legal right to evade it so far
'This was in 1798.

See I

MOORE, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 1-43 (1898).

'Id. at 45-64.
a 8 Stat. go (1794); 2 MILLER, op. cit. supra note 3, at 151.

See Ware v. Hylton,
3 U.S. (3 Dallas) 199 (1796).
'The other claims commission, not discussed here, was similarly constructed. It
was able to reach decisions in a considerable number of cases.
a The matter was eventually settled by treaty. 8 Stat. 196 (x8oz); 2 MILLER, op.
cit. supra note 3, at 488.
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as their membership in the United Nations and their obligations under
the Statute of the World Court are concerned? They cannot do both,
for the legal norm nemo judex inre sua is inseparable from the conception of law and of the rule of law. If and when the resolution pending
in the Senate is voted upon, the opportunity will come again, as it has
come from time to time in the past century and a half, to posit an indication of their answer to this question.
III
Roots of the opposing and mutually inconsistent policies, between
which choice has intermittently been expressed, penetrate deep into legal
and political philosophy. In the seventeenth century of Christendomthe century of Jamestown and Plymouth Rock-the struggle between
democracy and absolutism in the new monarchical nation-states of the
European international community that had succeeded less rigorous
regimes of preceding eras began to reach the decisive show-down stage.
So desperate had been the need for order under law that philosophers
like Bodin,9 while affirming the amenability of national rulers to international law as then understood, had urged internal absolutism, centralized in the person of the head of state, as the surest means of attaining and preserving order in national communities. He and other philosophers, seeking to imbue secular rulers with the authority formerly
inhering in the head of the predominant Christian church, essayed to
indoctrinate men with the ancient notion of the divine right of kings.
This, in the teachings of later philosophers, became nonliability of the
state to any law. The latter tenet survived internal absolutism and
preserved external anarchy.
The dichotomy between those philosophically-expounded pathways
which purposefully led to international order and those which necessarily led to international disorder could hardly have been more
pointedly illustrated than in the contemporary philosophies of Grotius' °
and Hobbes." The former, a man whose name has become a symbol
of law in the world community, plead for obedience by the rulers of
nation-states to universal law, which to him included the optimum of
reason as embodied in the wisdom of the ages. The latter, an upholder
of the Stuart kings' claims to absolutism, asserted, "Itis not wisdom
but authority that makes a law"; but he could find, as Professor
9

BODIN, DE LA REPUBLIQUE (1576) 3 DE REPUBLICA (1586).

DIVINE RIGHT OF KINGS 126 (2d ed. 192z).
10GROTIUS, DE Ju.E BELLI AC PACIS (1625).

" HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (16 x).

See FiGGIs,
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McIlwain says,-" "no better way to give a de jure character to his
potestas [authority to make laws] than the unhistorical compact"--an
imaginary transaction whereby the people as individuals were averred
to have irrevocably contracted away their natural liberty to an absolute
monarch hoping thus to gain security in orderly community life.
The idea of le contrat social, like that of divine right, has come
down from antiquity and has assumed various forms, not all of them
intended to uphold dictatorship, for the compact might be by the people
of the nation with one another, not with a single strong man in command. The late seventeenth century version of Locke1" and the most
famous of all, that of Rousseau 4 (late eighteenth century), were susceptible of use in support of the English and French revolutions directed
toward popular government. But whatever the form or impact of the
contract notion, its tendency was to substantiate the finality of the
national community and to make more difficult-if not impossiblein the world community the very order that was its objective for the
national communities. It has, no doubt, played its part in producing the
anomaly of popularly governed nation-states generally little if any less
disposed than autocracies to accept the prerequisites of world legal
order-witness the identical attitude of "great powers" at San Francisco
toward the unanimity rule for the permanent members of the Security
Council of the United Nations.
In the philosophy of Hegel,"5 who lived and wrote in the epoch
of the Napoleonic wars, the final dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire, and the overwhelming of the states of his native Germany-the
philosophy which more than a century later was to contribute effectively
to the intellectual defense of the National Socialism of the Hitler
regime-the theory of the deification of the state may be said to have
reached its zenith. The idea of national "sovereignty" in the French
revolutionary sense of the "sovereignty" of the people was developed
in Hegel's imagination into a mystical concept in which the thesis of the
natural rights of the individual human being and the antithesis of indispensable communal organization became the synthesis of the nation
personified in the divinely ruling head of state.
Hardly less mystical than the Hegelian effort at rationalization and
equally untenable as even a philosophers' justification of legal authority
12

AND THE CHANGING WORLD 27 (939).
LOCKE, OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (x69o).
"' ROUSSEAU, Du CONTRAT SOCIAL (762).
5
[ELEMENTS OF
" HEGEL, GRUNDLINIEN DER PHILOSOPHIE DES RECHTS (x8zi)
MCILWAIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM

1

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (Knox transl. x94z).]
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for a man's or a state's arrogation of finality of exclusive right of rulership and law-making, the contract myth maintained no standing in
nineteenth-century ideology. But the absolutist theories of the state to
which it had given sustenance remained. In place of ancient dogmas,
wholly secular "realism" had begun to characterize Western European
and North American jurisprudence. Outstanding has been the analytical positivist school of writers who seek to base their systems of legal
and political philosophy upon searching examination of the state as it
actually exists and functions in the world as they have found it.' 6 In
that world, the more powerful states, at least, have claimed each to be
final law unto itself. Accordingly, theirs is essentially a philosophy of
power politics' 7 rather than of law,' 8 for in the final analysis, a claim
in human affairs, to be above law makes sense only if accompanied by
a demonstration of power to defy the law.' 9 An analysis of nationstates of the past century and a half would seem to confirm this conclusion. To the analytical positivists, the law is essentially the expressed
will or command of the possessor of the law-making potestas. The
present-day possessors of such authority backed by power are the more
powerful of the eighty to ninety states that make up the world community. As the repositories of power, they are in a position to claim
that might makes right and so to claim the right to be answerable to no
law that as nation-states they do not choose to obey.
But it remains possible that they may choose to obey, that as members of the world community they may enact effective community law
that to abide by the law shall be compulsory, and that they may create
community institutions to see that abiding by the law is certainly brought
about and maintained.
Speaking for the Supreme Court of the United States in 1907 and
referring by citation to Bodin and Hobbes in a case involving the
"eE.g., AUSTIN,

LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE (i86-1863).

See also WILLOUGHBY,

AN EXAMINATION OF THE NATURE OF THE STATE (I9O63 1911 ) 5 THE FUNDAMENTAL
CONCEPTS OF PUBLIC LAW (1924).
" It is interesting to note that what is called the "Juristic Conception of the State"

emanates from writers of this school.
"5Judge de Visscher has pointed out that existing rules of international law relating
to the status asserted for themselves by nation states "largely represent in themselves a
compromise between law and power." DE VISSCHER, THEORIES ET REALITIZS EN DROIT
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC (1953)

[THEORY AND REALITY IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL

LAW 354. (Corbett transl. 1957)]10 In a recent article dealing with law, politics, and international disputes, a former
officer of the United States Department of State asserted that, under certain named
circumstances, "the United States would simply have to defy a Court decision." 516
INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION 31z (1958). Why "have to," "simply" or otherwise?
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"sovereignty" of the territory of Hawaii, Justice Holmes remarked:
"A sovereign is exempt from suit not because of any formal conception
or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there
can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on
which the right depends. 20 Whether or not this aspect of the claim to
be above the law is, indeed, one of indubitable logic or exemplary
practice, and, especially whether or not it has any relationship to the
amenability of a state to world law, it is characteristic of the attitude of
those who oppose acceptance of the third-party judgment of the World
Court in disputes between their own and other nations, such position
being equivalent to a claim that the state is above any law. Internally,
states now usually permit suits against themselves. If there is to be the
rule of law internationally, they must permit such suits in the International Court of Justice.
The principal utility of legal philosophers is to bring forth and
systematize ideas which may informally help judges and legislators in
their public tasks. However varying the implications of the doctrines
they formulate, and whether or not they are influential with those who
actually participate in interpretation and enactment of law, they have all
thought and written under decisive influence of the times and circumstances of their lives, usually with earnest desire to ameliorate conditions
with which they were personally familiar. They have not and could
not have spoken in a manner likely to give useful guidance in all later
times. The jurisprudence they have helped to evolve must ever be in
process of change to meet the needs of succeeding years and eras.
IV
In his exceedingly useful little book, The Constitution and World
Organization (1944),"2

Professor Corwin speaks of "three possible

conceptions" of what he calls "national sovereignty," of the first of
which he says that "sovereignty" may be regarded
...as

a concept of International Law and hence as limited by the obligations
which that law imposes upon members of the Family of Nations, including
the obligation to observe their contractual engagements with one another.
This concept, he says, possesses "very impressive historical support...";
it asserts, he adds, that
" Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 2o5 U.S. 34.9, 353 (19o7).
Professor Corwin does not support this theory.

21 pP. 1-3.
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International Law itself imposes certain limits on the sovereignty, and hence
on the freedom of action of members of the Family of Nations, and that every
nation upon its entrance into the Family of Nations consents to be bound by
those limits and continues thus bound so long as it remains a member of the
Family of Nations. Such limits are accordingly essential ingredients of each
nation's sovereignty---sovereignty, in short, exists within International Law
and the international order, not outside and above them; it is the obverse of
internationalobligation.
"That this was the theory most generally held by the founders of
our own nation," Professor Corwin affirms, "is not open to question."
Striking evidence of the correctness of this assertion is found in a statement in The Federalistby the man who was to become first chief justice of the United States. Certain opponents of the Constitution, he
22
tells us,
. ..though content that treaties should be made in the mode proposed, are
averse to their being the supreme law of the land. They insist, and profess
to believe, that treaties, like acts of assembly, should be repealable at pleasure.
This idea seems to be new and peculiar to this country, but new errors, as
well as new truths, often appear. These gentlemen would do well to reflect,
that a treaty is only another name for a bargain; and that it would be impossible to find a nation who would make any bargain with us, which should
be binding on them absolutely, but on us only so long and so far as we may
think proper to be bound by it. They who make laws, may without doubt,
amend or repeal them, and it will not be disputed that they who make
treaties, may alter or cancel them; but still let us not forget, that treaties are
made not by one only of the contracting parties, but by both; and consequently, that as the consent of both was essential to their formation at first, so
must it ever afterwards be to alter or cancel them. The proposed Constitution, therefore, has not in the least extended the obligation of treaties. They
are just as binding, and just as far beyond the lawful reach of legislative acts
now, as they will be at any future period, or under any form of government.
Despite the common sense and respect for law that mark this utterance, the "new errors" persisted and have become old. Their presence
with regard to what is now often called (correctly) international legislation, no less than with regard to international adjudication, shows
identity of attitude in the determination of their adherents to keep the
22No. 64, at 487 (Hamilton ed. 1866) (Jay). The Constitution reference is to art.
VI, declaring treaties to be "the supreme Law of the Land." See Chief Justice Jay's
charge to the jury in Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. (3 Dallas) 1, 3-5 (1794). See
also Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dallas) 199 (1796) i United States v. The Schooner
Peggy, 5 U.S. (. Cranch) 103 (io80.
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nation unresponsive to ever-growing, ever-more-pressing need in the
world as it is. In both phases of the common problem, the people of
the United States are confronted with opportunity so to develop their
policy as to build for themselves and their fellow peoples a higher
degree of safety by strengthening world legal order. The re-examination of the relation of the United States with the World Court, recommended by President Eisenhower in his State of the Union message,
1959,2 must now be considered.
Such re-examination could profitably range over much history and
take several mutually complementary directions. For present purposes, it must be confined rather closely to the essentials of the relevant
provision of the Court's Statute and the circumstances surrounding the
adoption of the words "as determined by the United States" in the
declaration of acceptance of the jurisdiction of the International Court
of Justice provided for in article 36 (2-6).
V
On August 26, 1946, the following declaration on the part of the
1946, was deposited with the SecretaryUnited States, dated August 14,24
Nations:
United
the
of
General
I, Harry S. Truman, President of the United States of America, declare
on behalf of the United States of America, under Article 36, paragraph 2, of
the Statute of the International Court of Justice, and in accordance with the
Resolution of August 2, 1946, of the Senate of the United States of America
(two-thirds of the Senators present concurring therein), that the United
States of America recognizes as compulsory ipso facto and without special
agreement, in relation to any other state accepting the same obligation, the

jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in all legal disputes hereafter
arising concerning
a. the interpretation of a treaty;
b. any question of international law;
o5 CONG. REc. 167 (daily ed. Jan. 9, 1959).
2' 6x Stat. xzs, , U.N.T.S. 9 (1946) (emphasis added).
20

Paragraphs 3 and 5 of

art. 36, of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, are as follows:
"3. The declarations referred to above may be made unconditionally or on condition
of reciprocity on the part of several or certain states, or for a certain time."
5"s.Declarations made under Article 36 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of
International Justice and which are still in force shall be deemed, as between the parties
to the present Statute, to be acceptances of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice for the period which they shall have to run and in accordance
with their terms."
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c. the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a
breach of an international obligation;
d. the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an
international obligation;
Provided, that this declaration shall not apply to
a. disputes the solution of which the parties shall entrust to other tribunals
by virtue of agreements already in existence or which may be concluded in the future; or
b. disputes with regard to matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States of America as determined by the
United States of Imerica;2 5 or
c. disputes arising under a multilateral treaty, unless (i) all parties to
the treaty affected by the decision are also parties to the case before the
Court, or (2) the United States of America specially agrees to jurisdiction; 2 6 and

Provided further, that this declaration shall remain in force for a period
of five years and thereafter until the expiration of six months after notice
may be given to terminate this declaration.

The inconsistency between the italicized words "recognizes as compulsory" and the italicized reservation "b" is hardly less than that between
the latter and paragraph six of article thirty-six of the Statute:
In the event of a dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction, the
matter shall be settled by the decision of the Court.
"As determined by" itself, accordingly, present' not only an internal
contradiction in the United States declaration of acceptance, but is
" The United States Senate appears to be the originator of this formula. Since
then, half a dozen other states have made equivalent reservations. Those of France
and of the United States were considered, respectively, by the World Court in the Norwegian Loans case, [957] I.C.J. Rep. 9; and the Interhandel case, [i957] I.C.J. Rep.
105 (interim measures), [i959] I.C.J. Rep. 6 (preliminary objections).
See notes 41
& 42 infra. In the former, France, suing Norway, which had accepted the jurisdiction of the Court under art. 36(7) without any comparable reservation, found itself
confronted by a ruling of the Court that under the reciprocity provisions of the article,
France's reservation entitled Norway to deny the Court's jurisdiction on the ground
that the subject of the adjudication was domestic as understood by Norway. France
thus lost its case. On July io, 1959, France filed a new declaration of acceptance
making exception of disputes "relating to questions which by international Law fall
exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction" (translation from French; emphasis added) 5
on September 14, 1959, India, which had previously terminated its declaration of
acceptance of jurisdiction under art. 36(z), filed a new declaration excepting disputes
relating to matters essentially within its jurisdiction, but did not include the further
reservation of determination by itself.
"6Like the last clause of reservation (b), this obscure and obstructive reservation
(c) should be eliminated from the United States declaration. Discussion of (c) is,
however, outside the scope of this article.
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obviously in direct conflict with a positive requirement of the basic law
of the Court, the Statute, part of the Charter of the United Nations
which the United States had, a year before, accepted, wholly without
any kind of reservation, with only two senators voting against it.
It would seem to follow that the reservation to the declaration must
be pronounced to be an attempt not only to be in a position to prevent
the Court from performing the normal function of courts, but to do so
inviolation of a provision of a treaty to which the United States was at
the time party and which, under its Constitution, it had made the law
of the land. The treaty thus violated contained another highly relevant
27
provision:
In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the
United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any
other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter
shall prevail.
To depart, by a mere unilateral act like the reservation, from law as
contained in a provision of a treaty to which the United States had
joined the greater part of the nations of the world in according such
primacy is, indeed, a far, far cry from the counsel of the man who became its first chief justice after he had written, "qet us not forget, that
treaties are made not by one only of the contracting parties, but by both;
and consequently, that as the consent of both was essential to their formation at first, so much it ever afterwards be to alter or cancel them."28
This is inescapably a matter not only of law and policy, but one affecting
the good faith, the national honor, of the people of the United States.
VI
"National honor" is a phrase that used to appear in arbitration
treaties to which the United States was a party. In the early days,
when that comparatively primitive form of effort to achieve international adjudication was looked upon with the same fearsomeness that
gripped the Senate when it overrode the counsel of its Committee on
Foreign Relations and superadded the reservation "as determined by"
the United States, arbitration treaties often excepted from the obligation
to arbitrate matters affecting "the vital interests, the independence, or
the honor"2 9 of the states parties. It may be passing strange that
27 U.N. CHARTER art. 1o3.
2THE FEDERALIST, No. 64, at 488 (Hamilton ed. z866) (Jay).
" E.g., art. i of Convention between the United States and France for settlement of
disputes by arbitration, 35 Stat. '9±5 (19o8), iox BR. AND FOR. ST. PAPERS soxg
(go8).
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honor, here deemed so sacred as to be above arbitral consideration,
should be so cavalierly treated by the Senate on other occasions, but the
point here to be emphasized is of another kind. Vague inclusive
phrases, like the one quoted from treaties of half a century ago, effectually liquidate obligation to refer disputes to the arbitral court. So

the arbitration treaties enacted prior to World War I,, contemplating
resort to the Permanent Court of Arbitration of the general convention
of the Hague for the pacific settlement of international disputes, were
unsatisfactory; and it was with a view to tightening the obligation to
arbitrate that in the large group of treaties enacted around 1930, such
exception was omitted and, as principal exception, was stipulated subject
matter "within the domestic jurisdiction of either of the High Contracting Parties? 80 In no case was "as determined by" the parties
themselves addedi on the other hand, records of the negotiations which
preceded enactment not only fail to give reliable evidence of such
intent, but indicate the intended criterion of determination according to
international law.3 1 Determination by itself, with finality, of the meaning of a rule of international law binding upon other states, does not
appear to have been claimed by any state even though claiming for itself
the right to be above that law.32
" E.g., Arbitration and conciliation treaty between the United States and Switzerland,
47 Stat. t983, 129 L.N.T.S. 465 (193-).
"' See Briggs, Towards the Rule of Law?, 51 AM. J. INT'L L. 517, 5z5-27 (-957).

Professor Briggs' position, based chiefly on the record of negotiation of the arbitration
treaty between the United States and Belgium, 1o9 L.N.T.S. z69, 46 Stat. 2790 (930),

art. 11(a) of which contains a provision identical with that quoted, is challenged with
some cogency, but in the opinion of the present writer inconclusively, by Professor
Sidney B. Jacoby, formerly of the United States Department of Justice, in Towards the
Rule of Law?, 52 AM. J. INT'L 107 (1958).

In 1958, Professor Briggs delivered a

course of lectures before the Academy of International Law at The Hague. See Briggs,
Reservations to the A4cceptance of Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Court
of Justice, 70 HAGuJF RECUIL 225 (1958).
" In this general connection, a passage of Judge de Visscher, op. cit. supra note S,

at 347, is of interest. He says that "the form recently given by some States to the
reservation excluding compulsory jurisdiction of disputes relating to internal affairs
or 'matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction' marks a retreat to
earlier practice. Before the second world war, none of the States making a reservation
of this kind had claimed the right to decide by itself and without appeal the question of
its legitimate application. The texts of the period, modelled at once on Article 15,
paragraph 8, of the Covenant of the League of Nations, and on Article 39 of the Geneva
General Act, 1978, explicitly referred the question whether or not a dispute related to a
matter within 'the exclusive jurisdiction of the State' to international law, interpreted,
in case of debate, by the Court. This solution favored progress in international law
since it opened the way for the rules of that law into questions left until then to the
discretion of the State."
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Between the mid-thirties and mid-forties of the twentieth century,
the general world policy of the United States underwent a fundamental
change of unprecedentedly immense significance. Even current phrases
like the Congress-dictated "neutrality" acts and the Senate-inflicted
defeat of the World Court (notwithstanding noninclusiveness of jurisdiction without special agreement) became as irrelevant to an appraisal
of that policy as the language of the pre-World War I arbitration
treaties. World War II had taught its cataclysmic lessons. In its wake,
the United States had not only led the movement for, but had become
party to, the Charter of the United Nations, of which the World Court
statute was an integral part, and the Court had become the "principal
judicial organ" 33 of the United Nations. In reporting the Charter and
Statute to the Senate, the Foreign Relations Committee called attention
to a recommendation of a commission of the San Francisco Conference
that members of the United Nations should proceed as soon as possible
to make declarations of acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Court without special agreement. And it had added the caveat: "Unless we are
prepared to take all steps which are necessary to effectuate our membership in the United Nations we would be merely deceiving the hopes of
34
the United States and humanity in ratifying the Charter."
Although a resolution for such acceptance was introduced into the
Senate almost immediately, more than a year passed before action was
taken. In a report of admirable perceptivity and clarity,86 the Foreign
Relations Committee unanimously recommended excepting from the
application of the declaration "disputes with regard to matters which
are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States."
Such exception the Committee felt to be in principle "implicit in the
nature of international Law," which, under its Statute, it is the duty of
the Court to apply. "International Law," continued the Committee,
is, by definition, the body of rights and duties governing states in their relations with each other and does not, therefore, concern itself with matters of
domestic jurisdiction. The question of what is properly a matter of international law is, in case of dispute, appropriate for decision by the Court itself,
since, if it were left to the decision of each individual state, it would be pos"U.N. CHARTER art. 9z; STAT. INT'L CT. JUST. art. i.
84 Quoted by Professor Philip C. Jessup in the Hearings on S. Res. z96 before a
Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 79 th Cong., zd Sess. 147
(946).
See STAT. INT'L CT. JUST.
3r S. REP. No. 1835, 79 th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, 5 (1946).
art. 38().
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sible to withhold any case from adjudication on the plea that it is a matter
of domestic jurisdiction.

Thus, the Committee demonstrated its complete understanding of
what it was recommending. It may be confidently assumed that no
one has ever hinted that in line with some vague allegation of tradition
or policy omission of the words "as determined by the United States"
nevertheless left such determination to the United States. Other states
reserving "matters of domestic jurisdiction" had in no case expressly
reserved to themselves the right of decision. The Committee had
unreservedly concluded
...that a reservation of the right of decision as to what are matters essentially within domestic jurisdiction would tend to defeat the purposes which
it is hoped to achieve by means of the proposed declaration as well as the
purpose of article 36, paragraphs 2 and 6, of the Statute of the Court.

Clinching its argument, the Committee pointed out:

6

The United States has now become a member of the Court, but membership in itself means comparatively little. It is true that states can agree to
submit specified cases to the Court, but they have always been able to settle
their disputes by arbitration, assuming they could agree to do so. So long as
individual members can refuse to be haled into the Court a regime of law in
the international community will never be realized. The most important
attribute of this or any other court is to hear and decide cases. For this function it must have jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter.

"The ultimate purpose of the resolution," the Committee pointed
out,
is to lead to general world-wide acceptance of the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in legal cases. The accomplishment of this result
would, in a substantial sense, place international relations on a legal basis, in
contrast to the present situation, in which states may be their own judge of
the law.

But there remained the vote of the Senate.
VII
The tragedy of that vote, the results of which have been set forth
above, is in no sense lessened by the possibility that some of its implications may not have been fully understood by all of those whose votes
determined the issue. Some six weeks previously, a subcommittee of
" S. REP. No. 1835, 79 th Cong. 2d Sess. 3 (x946).
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the Foreign Relations Committee held hearings on the proposed resolution, during the course of which the following dialogue occurred between one of the members of the subcommittee and the Senator who
had introduced the Resolution:s7
Senator AUSTIN. How much of a restriction would you regard the
insertion of certain words in that clause "b," relating to who decides that
question of what is domestic jurisdiction-that is, would you regard it as
nullifying your purpose, if you inserted into this phrase, "disputes with regard
to matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the United
States," which would make it read:
disputes which are held by the United States to be with regard to matters
which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States?
Senator MORSE. I would accept the language.
Senator AUSTIN. You would?
Senator MORSE. I would accept the language.
Senator AUSTIN. Otherwise, I foresee the conflict that naturally would
arise over such questions as immigration, the interpretation of a treaty for
example with respect to the immigration of orientals.
Senator MORSE. I would accept the language as of now.
Senator AUSTIN. Yes.
The apparently astonished "You would?" seems significant. Senator
Morse had some eloquent words for the subcommittee--"that the only
hope of our survival as a nation, and the only hope of a survival of the
peoples of the world.., is to be found in the development of an ever
stronger and stronger international organization"--and he ably combatted in the debate in the Senate38 and cast his vote against the amendment so ominously adumbrated in Senator Austin's query. But those
who, whatever their purpose, or their lack of purpose, acted to make
international organization and the World Court weaker, carried the day
overwhelmingly.
VIII
So what was excepted is "the domestic jurisdiction of the United
States of America as determined by the United States of America": A
mighty utterance indeed! but what does it mean? How, for instance,
does the United States of America determine what is within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States of America? In these days of
"'Hearings,supra note 34, at 36.
asgz CONG. REc. iO6z9-31 (1946); also, especially, id. at io695, C. 2. But see,
id. at 2o683-84. For the vote on the Connally amendment, see id. at 1o697; on the
resolution of acceptance, see id. at I07o5-o6; for text as adopted, see id. at 107o6.
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seemingly near approach of interplanetary travel within the narrow
confines of that atom of the universe, the solar system, the long-awaited
man from Mars may be already on his way. So oracular are the words
of the reservation that, if democratically-minded, he might assume a
national plebiscite or, failing that, a joint-resolution of Congress or a
Senate resolution (two-thirds of the Senators present concurring therein). Learning a bit of the political philosophy inhering in this minor
fraction of the little globe on which he had alighted, the Martian
might quite conceivably conclude that the decision would be taken by
that department of the tripartite government in which the "judicial
Power of the United States" is vested, 39 presumably the "one Supreme
Court"; for surely what is essentially within jurisdiction, domestic or
otherwise, is essentially a judicial question. But some denizen of earth
might whisper the oft-quoted words of the man who became the great
chief justice: "The President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations ...2"' To which the astonished space-traveler quite
likely would reply: "External? but is there not available the jurisdiction
of a Court of your own little world community? Are not your people
among the signers of its constitution? Is it not a part of your own
national governmental setup, extended? In short, is it not your Court?"
Precisely how the determination by the United States of its domestic
jurisdiction was, in the contemplation of the authors of the reservation,
to be determined appears to have been little discussed. Is the President supposed to render a considered decision? Presumably he could
successfully assert authority to do so. Could or should the Congress
enact legislation requiring him to do so?-in which event, by what
subordinate would the determination in fact essentially be made? In
case the Departments of State and Justice should disagree, which would
prevail? What actually was the procedure in the famous Interhandel
case? 4' Maybe the man from Mars might be employed as a researcher
oU.S. CONST. art. III, § i.
in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319

40Quoted

(1936). Lawrence Preuss, 32 A.B.AJ. 661 (1946), takes it for granted that "the
President alone" will determine whether a dispute involves matters essentially within
U.S. domestic jurisdiction.
" A review of this World Court case appears in this issue of the Journal, infra at 73See also supra note 25. The Institute of International Law, meeting at Neuchatel,
Switzerland, adopted on Sept. ix, 1959, resolutions in part as follows:
"In an international community the members of which have renounced recourse
to force and undertaken by the Charter of the United Nations to settle their international
disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and
justice, are not endangered, recourse to the International Court of justice or to another
international court or arbitral tribunal constitutes a normal method of settlement of
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to ascertain just where in the civil service hierarchy essentially domestic
jurisdiction has been or is most likely hereafter to be essentially
determined.
As for the people of the United States, it would seem in the highest
sense essential to determine whether it is safer or more enlightened to
leave such determination to nonjudicial oflicialdom, or to their World
Court. It is undeniable that the World Court is a part of the governmental apparatus that belongs to the people of the United States. It
is theirs for use, service, and support. It was created through collaboration of their treaty-making power. It is required by the most solemn
and effectual of international constitutional law to decide all cases before
it, whether or not involving jurisdiction, in accordance with recognized
rules of law. One of the fully-recognized rules of world law is that
domestic questions must be left to national jurisdiction. The history of
the Court is a conclusive demonstration of its conscientious judicial
conservatism.
The most basic political conservatism in the world today is that
which promotes the development of legal order in the world community. To strengthen the Court by eliminating vetoes to the performance
of its judicial duties is one of the most fruitful means to this end. France
and India have removed from their acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction
their reservations as determined by themselves, in originally making
which they followed the example of the United States. 2 Nothing
could be more fitting than for the United States to follow their genuinely emulatory reverse action. To do so would be to get back on the
road of human progress.
legal disputes as defined in Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the International

Court of Justice....
"It is highly desirable that States having excluded from their acceptance of the
compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in virtue of Article 36,
paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court matters which are essentially within their
domestic jurisdiction as determined by their own government, or having made similar
reservations, should withdraw such reservations having regard to the judgments given
and opinions expressed in the Norwegian Loans and Interhandel cases and to the risk to
which they expose themselves that other States may invoke such reservations against
them."
42 The texts in English of the French and Indian declarations, dated respectively
July io and September 14, 1959, appear in this issue of the Journal, infra at 84.

